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ORACULAR CONSULTATION, FATE, AND THE CONCEPT OF
THE INDIVIDUAL 
Esther Eidinow
‘... a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a
dynamic centre of awareness, emotion, judgment, and action organized into a distinctive
whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes and against its social and
natural background’1
 
‘Let’s face it. We’re undone by each other. And if we’re not, we’re missing something.’2
Introduction
Anthropologists have observed that in the modern West, ‘the “self” is conceived
of as more autonomous from other people and outside influences… than in other
times  and  places.’3 The  quotation  from  Clifford  Geertz’s  work,  set  at  the
beginning of this chapter, neatly summarises a number of characteristics of that
understanding of the autonomous self, and the perception of each individual as
being  cognitively  integrated  and  organised.  As  Geertz  goes  on  to  observe,
‘however incorrigible it may seem to us, [this is] a rather peculiar idea within the
context of the world’s cultures’.4  
This paper sets out to reflect on the usefulness, or otherwise, of that ‘peculiar
idea’ in the context of the remit of this conference – the exploration of ‘religious
individualisation within the medium of religion’.5 Specifically, it will examine the
significance of this conception of the self, among others, for our understanding of
the ritual practice of oracular consultation in ancient Greece, focusing primarily
on the evidence of the question tablets from the sanctuary at Dodona, augmented
by related literary material for oracular consultation. As I have argued elsewhere,
the material from  Dodona offers insights into the social construction of risk in
ancient Greek culture.6
1 GEERTZ 1983, 59.
2 BUTLER 2003, 13.
3 STRAUSS/QUINN 1997, 28.
4 GEERTZ 1983, 59.
5 The conference flyer describes how the Erfurt working group examines the ‘presence and
extent  of  individual  scope  for  religious  action,  the  resulting  embodiment  of  religious




This  paper  builds  on that  work to  consider  how those  who consulted  the
Oracle  conceptualised  themselves  as  individuals.  It  argues,  first,  that  it  is
important to be aware of the implicit model that we bring to this exploration, and
then asks whether and how other models of the self, both modern and ancient,
may offer useful challenges or nuances. 
Among these alternatives  are  relational  models  of  the self,  and this  paper
suggests that for an ancient Greek, a relational model of the self included a sense
of interdependence not only with other mortals, but also with supernatural forces.
This can be seen most clearly, and perhaps most puzzlingly, in the ancient Greek
conception of an individual’s fate, luck and fortune, in which mortal and divine
were inextricably linked. This, in turn, provides a crucial aspect of the conceptual
context of oracular consultation – and for understanding the sense of self that the
evidence for this activity suggests.
The paper begins with a very brief overview of some of the ways in which
conceptions of the self have developed in modern Western thought – and then
introduces some alternatives to those conceptions, ancient and modern.
1. Constructions of the Individual
1.1 Modern Constructions: Risk and Reflexivity
There is, of course, a multiplicity of theories about the self in modern sociological
theory, and it is impossible to cover them all here: my intention is to stimulate
debate  and further  work,  rather  than  to  be  comprehensive.  What  follows  is  a
necessarily partial sketch of a small selection of theorists that I hope will help to
make explicit some of our current understandings of the nature of the self, and
thus illustrate the argument of this paper most clearly. 
One of the most influential modern theories of the self has emerged from the
work of Antony Giddens, whose work on the individual in a context of risk is par-
ticularly relevant to the considerations of this paper. Giddens himself picks out the
key elements of the self by analysing a work of self-help: Self-Therapy: a guide to
becoming your own therapist  by Janette Rainwater.7 There he finds evidence for
the conception of the self as a self-making project – dominated by the day-to-day
plethora  of  choices  that  confront  each  person  in  the  ‘post-traditional  social
universe’.8
Although  in  some  ways  this  reinforces  the  ideas  expressed  in  Geertz’s
quotation above, it adds important nuances. Indeed, far from saying that the self is
conceived of as more distant from outside influences, Giddens focuses on the re-
lationship between the self and social structure: the integrated self emerges as a
conscious  response  to  the  events  and  social  forces  with  which  people  must
constantly interact.  Individuals  construct  a  coherent  self-identity,  engaged in a
7 RAINWATER 1989; analysed in GIDDENS, 1991, ch. 3.
8 GIDDENS 1991, 81.
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constant  process  of  monitoring  and  negotiating  lifestyle  choices,  and  this
‘reflexive project of the self’ is key to Giddens’s analysis.9 This dynamic, ongoing
process  emerges  from our  modern  context,  where  the  breakdown of  tradition
results  in  a  ‘pluralisation  of  contexts  of  actions  and  the  diversity  of
“authorities”’.10 Self-identity is  not  to  be found in our  body or  our  traits,  our
behaviour or the reactions of others.11 Rather it is ‘the self as reflexively under-
stood by the person in terms of her or his biography’:  identity is located in ‘the
capacity to keep a particular narrative going.’12
This process of creating the self is one that encompasses a comprehensive
chronology. It involves not only our particular actions in the present, but also our
interpretation  of  past  and  future  events.  The  idea  of  strategic  life-planning
becomes  particularly  important  –  and  individuals  must  learn  to  ‘colonise  the
future’, that is, to exercise control over what is to come. They do this in a world
that  is  leaving  behind  traditional  ways  of  thought  and  action,  and  comprises
instead a realm of (constantly)  new possibilities – and new fears.  As a result,
people develop an increasing awareness of risks in every aspect of their lives –
from local to global, from individual to institutional’.13 As they seek opportunities
for themselves, as they strive to achieve ‘self-actualisation’, they must learn to
identify and assess these risks.14 
Unsurprisingly, this emerging concept of the self, and the need for self-actu-
alisation and self-fulfilment in a changing context also shapes the nature of re-
lationships, which transform intimacy: ‘the formation of personal and erotic ties’
are ‘guided by the mutuality of self-disclosure.’15 Giddens draws attention to what
9 GIDDENS 1991, 5.
10 GIDDENS 1991, 5&7.
11 GIDDENS 1991, 53–54.
12 GIDDENS 1991, 53, 54; italics in original.
13 GIDDENS 1991, 85, and see p. 111 for a useful concise description of the colonization of the
future.
14 BECK 1994a.  Many of the ideas that  GIDDENS proposes  are close to the ‘individualisation
theory’ of  Ulrich  Beck,  whose  work  also  places  emphasis  on  risk.  He  argues  (14)  that
‘Individualisation is a compulsion… for the manufacture, self-design and self-staging of not
just  one’s  own biography but also its  commitments and networks as  preferences and life
phases change, but, of course, under the overall conditions and models of the welfare state,
such as the educational system (acquiring certificates) the labour market, labour and social
law, the housing market and so on.’ All of these choices bring risks–but they also encourage
(20) ‘an emigration to new niches of activity and identity’.  However, in a number of ways
Beck’s approach to modernity and its  risks is importantly different from that  of Giddens:
Beck’s ‘reflexivity’ is the ‘autonomous, undesired and unseen, transition from industrial to
risk society’, and his risk society is one in which ‘the threats produced so far on the path of
industrial society begin to predominate’ (see BECK 1994a, 6). Unlike Giddens, he argues that
‘it  is  not  knowledge,  but  rather  non-knowledge  which  is  the  medium  of  “reflexive”
modernization’ (Beck 1994b, 175) and opens up the possibility that it may not result in ‘new
and better possibilities for action’ (ibid., 177) but rather unconscious self-endangerment, and
even self-dissolution. See also BRYANT/JARY 2001, 3–42, esp. 28.
15 GIDDENS 1990, 124.
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he calls the ‘pure relationship’, which focuses on intimacy, achieved through the
development of mutual trust that cannot be taken for granted, must be worked at,
needs to be won.16 Its acquisition turns on communication, equal emotional give
and take, and the notion of ‘confluent love’, that is, a love that is contingent on
reciprocal sexual pleasure, in a society in which most people have ‘the chance to
become sexually accomplished.’17 This  kind  of  relationship  is  sought  only for
what it brings those involved in it. Thus reflexive questioning lies at its core: those
involved are looking for ‘the rewards the relationship delivers’ that will aid the
reflexive project of the self.18
This notion of the coherent self has been criticised for its emphasis on indi-
vidual self-mastery, and in particular for overlooking the part played by what we
might call more personal aspects of the individual: for example, daily interactions
with  others,  memory  of  past  experiences,  the  sub-conscious  shaping  of  our
psyche.19 The  conception  of  self  that  Giddens  depicts  is,  for  some,  over-
rationalized  and  oversocialized.20 For  example,  the  notion  that  intimate
relationships  are  about  self-actualisation  and  explicit  communication  has  been
criticised  for  ignoring  the  ‘sweaty,  heaving  and  breathless  bodies,  animalistic
urges and sexual fluids which might colonize the mind and interfere,  however
temporarily, with the reflexive and democratic processes of talk work central to
“confluent love”’.21 
Other attempts to analyse or describe the modern Western conception of the
self draw attention to aspects not included in  Giddens’s approach. For example,
some theorists focus on the multiplicity of identities that, they argue, we create in
different situations. Perhaps most famously, Erving Goffman depicted the self-as-
character, or rather characters, ‘staged’ in different social situations.22 Goffman’s
theory alludes  to  a central  self,  behind the multiple  identities,  who makes the
particular choices about self-presentation and who is, crucially, aware of the risks
involved in  these social  performances:  ‘given to  having fantasies  and dreams,
some that pleasurably unfold a triumphant performance, others full of anxiety and
dread that nervously deal with vital discreditings in a public front region’23 The
concept of the self here is famously puzzling, with some arguing that the self is
reduced simply to ‘role-playing performances’ and others that it either portrays the
individual’s struggle against the forces of society, or, more recently, evokes the
postmodern  state.24 However,  what  Goffman’s  approach  does  emphasise  is  a
16 GIDDENS 1991, 97.
17 GIDDENS 1992, 61 and 63.
18 GIDDENS 1991, 91.
19 See ELLIOTT 2008, 50–52; CRAIB 2011, 124–125.
20 SHILLING/MELLOR 2001, 130–146, formulation from 137, drawing on CRAIB 1992.
21 SHILLING/MELLOR 2001, 138.
22 GOFFMAN 1959, 252–255.
23 GOFFMAN 1959, 253.
24 Role-playing: e.g.,  MACINTYRE 1969. For discussion of views of Goffman, see  BRANAMAN
2001, 100–101.
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crucial interdependence between individuals, that is, between the self and those
before whom it performs.25 
A similar focus is found in Harrison White’s work, which also draws attention
to  the  ways  in  which  different  social  interactions  forge  individuals,  which  he
describes  as  ‘bundles  of  identities’,  constantly  created  as  we  move  between
contexts and relations.26  He distinguishes between ‘identity’, which he defines as
‘any source of action, any entity to which observers can attribute meaning not
explicable from biophysical  regularities’ and ‘our  everyday notion  of  the self,
which  takes  for  granted  consciousness  and  integration,  and  presupposes
personality’.27 Whereas  Goffman  emphasises  the  ways  in  which  role-players
support each other in playing their particular role and maintaining their particular
identity,  White’s analysis turns on the struggle for control-both between people
and within people – as we move between different social settings.28 He describes
four particular senses or dynamics of identity, which describe the different ways in
which an individual relates to himself and others, and he argues that it is the role
of narrative to weave these different senses of identity together.29 Both  Goffman
and White explore notions of interdependence in their approaches to the develop-
ment  and presentation  of  the  self.  This  aspect  is  even  more  explicit  in  some
approaches – and we turn to those next.
1. 2 Modern Constructions: Dividuality and Dispossession
A very different conception of the self, which contrasts markedly with the more
bounded ideas prevalent in modern Western societies can be found, for example,
in societies in the Pacific Islands.30 Marilyn Strathern, drawing on her fieldwork in
the Highlands of Papua New Guinea, uses the idea of the ‘dividual’ rather than the
‘individual’ to describe the self-conception of Melanesians. She argues that the
people she studied conceive of both their  body and their  self  as comprising a
‘microcosm of  relations’.31 Turning  to  Micronesia,  Catherine  Lutz  has  argued
somewhat similarly for the idea that Ifaluk islanders conceive of themselves ‘only
secondarily,  and in  a  limited way’ as  autonomous individuals.32 This  seems to
provide a strong contrast with the Western ideology of personhood – or at least
with the aspects that receive most emphasis in Western culture. As others have
25 See discussion SRINIVASAN 1990, 141–162.
26 WHITE 2008, 2. 
27 WHITE 2008, 2–3.
28 GOFFMAN 1959, 77 and WHITE 2008, 2–3.
29 WHITE 2008, 10.
30 LINDSTROM 1999, 195–207.
31 STRATHERN 1988, 131. See  LIPUMA 1998, on 58–59 he provides a clear set of contrasting
characteristics of ‘Western and Melanesian Personhood’ – the contrast is between ‘the West’s
own self-understanding, which exists both ideologically and normatively…and an account of
the foregrounded elements of peronhood in traditional, nonencompassed Melanesia’.
32 LUTZ 1988, 81.
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argued, constructing a strong opposition between cultures overlooks the ways in
which both individual and dividual characteristics of personhood exist and emerge
in different cultures, so Edward LiPuma has suggested: ‘It would seem rather that
persons  emerge  precisely  from  that  tension  between  dividual  and  individual
aspects/relations.’33 The  Western  person  is  also,  in  reality,  interdependent,
although these characteristics may not be recognised or valued.34 As the quotation
at the beginning of the chapter illustrates, Judith Butler has explored the notion of
the dividuated self in her examination of ‘our vulnerability to loss and the task of
mourning that follows’.35 Our current understanding of the bounded conception of
self may be essential to ensure our legal status, but is insufficient if we want to
describe ‘what we are about’.36 She argues instead that we are ‘constituted by our
relations’ – and beyond this, that, in turn, our relationality with others creates a
primary vulnerability,  an exposure to  others,  which  places  us  at  risk of  being
‘dispossessed’.37 She roots this vulnerability in our physical selves, arguing that it
develops from ‘bodily life’ – not only the more obvious potential dangers of gaze,
touch and violence that a body creates, but ways in which the body is forged in the
‘crucible of social life’.38 This process of formation means that the self includes
‘the enigmatic traces of others’, creating a foreignness that means an individual is
never fully in control or even in full knowledge of her self. 
Butler’s  work  is  a  manifesto  on  the  topic,  arguing  that  recognizing  this
relational conception of self, arising from and in the practice of mourning, may
lead to an ethics of nonviolence, and a new humanized approach to community
and  international  relations,  and  politics.  For  the  purposes  of  this  paper,  her
argument turns our attention to a number of important themes about the nature and
role of conceptions of the self, including their political and ethical significance. If
we conceive of the individual as inherently interconnected with others, then this
evokes an individual whose own constitution creates inescapable affiliations and
vulnerabilities, because of the nature of the physical and social self. 
In this section I have tried to give a very brief overview of different con-
ceptions of the self, drawing attention to the possibility of a conception that em-
phasises  relationality  and  interdependence.  In  what  follows,  I  will  raise  the
possibility that an ancient Greek conception of the self as interdependent may be
traced in the evidence for the behaviour of individuals generally in episodes of de-
liberation and decision making, and specifically in their approach to, and expecta-
tions of, oracular sanctuaries. 
33 LIPUMA 1998, 56–61, and quotation 57 (his italics).
34 LIPUMA 1998, 60–61.
35 BUTLER 2003, 9.
36 BUTLER 2003, 15.
37 BUTLER 2003, 14.
38 BUTLER 2003, 15.
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1.3 Ancient Constructions: Divided Deliberations
When we turn to evidence for the representation of the individual in ancient Greek
literature,  we  find  that  the  idea  of  the  dividuated  self  appears  explicitly  with
regard to processes of deliberation, and also implicitly with regard to beliefs about
fate.
First, the explicit: in descriptions of processes of individual deliberation we
see not so much a relational self, at least at first sight, but rather a complex ‘inner’
self.  Of the multitude of words used to describe the organs responsible for/the
location of psychological processes, the  thymos in particular appears to particip-
ate,  almost  as  a  separate  entity,  in  the  deliberations  of  an  individual.  In  the
Homeric epics it appears involved before, during and after processes of delibera-
tion. For example, in the Odyssey,  Athena, in disguise, debates with Telemachus
about the future of  Odysseus’ house, and says of  Penelope (l.275–1.276) ‘if her
thymos urges her  to be married,  let  her  return to the great  hall  of her mighty
father’;  Alcinous  (8.27)  begins  a  speech  to  the  Phaeacians  saying  ‘what  his
thymos bids’; in the cave of the Cyclops  Odysseus’ initial impulse to escape is
checked  by  heteros  thymos  (9.302)  –  we  might  translate  this  as  ‘a  second
thought’.39 We often  find  an  individual  debating  kata  thymon,  and,  when  this
process is elaborated, it appears to mean a debate with one’s thymos: for example,
we find Odysseus, isolated in battle, speaking to his proud thymos about what is to
become of him (Iliad 11.403), and at the end of his considerations, asking why his
thymos is arguing with him in this way (Iliad 11.407); the process is described
(l.411) as him debating kata phrena kai kata thymon. The same sequence is used
to describe a number of deliberations, usually in the heat of battle.40 This is not to
argue that  Homeric man was fragmented, but to observe how, in situations that
involve  making a  decision,  we see the  complexity of  the  deliberative  process
depicted by means of these descriptions of the thymos, and its role in presenting
convincing arguments and/or needing to be persuaded.41
In  his  analysis  of  the  nature  of  the  soul,  Jan  Bremmer  suggests  that  the
thymos may indicate the notion of an ancient Greek conception of the ‘ego soul’,
that is, an aspect or version of the soul that refers to individual living conscious-
ness – their inner life.42 It may be that this divided inner self has its roots in an
39 In contrast, in the underworld (Od. 11. 105) Tiresias instructs him to restrain his thymos and
that of his companions.
40 Menelaos’ deliberations (Iiad 17.90, 97, 17.107); Agenor (Iiad 21.552, 562, without the final
summary);  Hector (Iiad 22.98, 22.122, again the summary of his thought process does not
include mention of his thymos); and finally Achilles (Iiad 22.385).
41 See in particular WILLIAMS 1993, ch.2 especially his arguments against Bruno SNELL (1975)
and the idea that Homeric man lacked a complete conception of the self.
42 BREMMER 1983. He draws the term ‘ego soul’ from the work of Ernst Arbman on Vedic soul
belief in India. Arbman identified body souls (which give the body life and consciousness)
and free souls (‘an unencumbered soul representing the individual personality’). The ego soul
is a subdivision of the body soul, along with the life soul (usually identified with the breath) it
represents  an  individual’s  inner  life;  for  this  description,  quotation  and  more  detail,  see
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external relationality: Christopher Gill notes the depiction in archaic and classical
Greek thought of the inner person as divided – and he has explored how this fits
into a larger conception of the person, which combines an objective psychological
standpoint with a participant and objectivist ethical standpoint.43 Instead of our
more  modern  conception  of  the  person,  which  emphasises  first-personal
experience or subjective criteria as offering a privileged locus of knowledge or
autonomous judgment, the ‘objective-participant’ conception highlights the idea
of participation in relationships as ‘central to one’s selfhood or personality’, and
emphasises a third-personal point of view.44 
Gill has set out this approach in two key volumes: in the first, he shows how
the objective-participant model can be illustrated with examples from  Homeric
epic and Attic tragedy, as well as fourth-century philosophical writing; the second
follows  the  development  of  conceptions  of  selfhood  and  personality  into
Hellenistic  philosophical  thought.  In  both  volumes,  we  see  the  essential  role
played by oral dialogue in Greek culture, as Gill himself emphasises.45 Thus, in
Homeric epic and Attic tragedy and philosophical writing of the fourth century we
find characters working out what is right, what they should do, or what is know-
ledge,  using  shared  enquiry  and  debate.’46 The  fact  that  sometimes  these
characters are alone, and experiencing an internal debate between different parts
of their psyche, shows that the process of deliberation and decision-making could
be depicted as occurring as a  dialogue or even a discussion – even when the
process took place for a lone individual. 
Turning to  more  implicit  expressions  of  personhood,  we find  an  essential
interconnection, even integration, between mortal and supernatural is a key part of
the ancient Greek ‘folk model’ of fate, luck and fortune.47 Just as an individual’s
mind and body were perceived as open to being shaped by supernatural forces, in
the same way, their life course was understood as being a result of interwoven
mortal  and  supernatural  elements.  We  see  this  in  the  way in  which  fate  and
character  are  seemingly  identified  across  a  range  of  sources:  implicitly,  for
example, in Herodotus’s account of the behaviour and bad ending of Polykrates –
whose  character  drives  him  on  towards  his  fated  end;48 to  Thucydides’
descriptions, in his own voice and those of the fighting men he gives voice to, of
BREMMER 1983, 9.
43 GILL 2006, 341.
44 GILL 2006,  340,  and  GILL 1996.  A  full  overview  of  the  characteristics  of  these  two
conceptions  is  provided  in  the  latter  volume,  11.  In  particular,  he  examines   (405)  how
modern ideas of personhood have been fundamentally shaped by the Cartesian conception of
the self as a fundamentally integrated subject – whether one takes that narrowly, as indicating
a consciousness of oneself, or more broadly, as informing one’s larger understanding of, and
ethical judgment about, the world.
45 GILL 1996, 16 and  GILL 2006, 341.
46 GILL 2006, 403.
47 EIDINOW 2011.
48 Herodotus 3.142.3, with Eidinow 2011, 93–116.
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the nature of tyche;49 to the debate between Demosthenes and Aeschines about the
nature of a single man’s  tyche and the threat it may pose to the city.50 In these
examples we see how one’s fate was perceived as being both in one’s own hands,
and yet, at the same time, to be granted by supernatural powers. For the ancient
Greeks, the problem of individual free will did not arise because each individual’s
choices  about  how  to  act  were  fundamentally  inseparable  from  supernatural
influence: as Heraclitus observes ‘a man’s character is his daimon’.51 
There is other evidence, too, that, at the divine level, there was further delib-
eration to be made. As numerous examples suggest, the supernatural hierarchy of
fate was far from straightforward. We see this in the Homeric epics, in which the
relationship  between  Zeus,  the  others  gods,  and  Moira,  is  never  conclusively
delineated.52 Herodotus’s Histories provides examples that are explicitly related to
oracular consultation. In  Croesus’ discussion with  Apollo, the god explains both
how  Croesus’ life-course  was fixed  before his  birth,  and how limited  was his
opportunity for intercession (with the Fates).53 In the second oracle given to the
Athenians as they consult about the Persian invasion, the text appears to suggest
that Athene had attempted to intercede (with Zeus) on their behalf.54 This literary
conception of the self-in-deliberation, and the way in which it involved the divine
and other supernatural forces, may in turn shed light on the process of oracular
consultation.
2. Constructions of Oracular Consultation
2.1 Contests and Consensus
In a recent volume exploring ancient divination, Walter Burkert has described the
process  of  oracular  consultation  as  evolving  into  ‘a  contest  of  intelligence’
between  Oracle  and  consultant(s).  As  the  ambiguity of  oracular  responses  in-
creased,  so  the  debates  about  their  meaning  became  more  ingenious.55 This
provides  a  neat  example  of  the  way in  which  modern  analysis  of  the  role  of
Oracles in the ancient world has tended to depend, implicitly, on the ideological
model of individual personhood found in modern Western culture. Based on that
set of conceptions of the individual, modern academic approaches tend to view
Oracle consultation as part of a project of self-realisation in which information is
integrated into the decision-making processes of a fundamentally integrated and
49 For  example  Thucydides  6.17.1.  Where  Thucydides  describes  the  fortunate  character  of
Nicias’; for more examples, see discussion Eidinow 2011, 126 ff.
50 Aeschines  (Against  Ctesiphon)  3.157;  Demosthenes  (On  the  Crown) 18.252–75,  with
Eidinow 2011, 143 ff.
51 Heraclitus DK 22 B 119.
52 See discussion EIDINOW 2011, 32–35.
53 Herodotus 1.191.2.
54 Herodotus 7.141.3.
55 BURKERT 2005, 29–49; the quotation is from p. 39.
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autonomous individual. In Gill’s terms, we may describe this as being based on a
subjective-individualist model of the self. In this conception, the individual and
Oracle are set in opposition to each other: the Oracle has the information needed,
which must be extracted and then processed by the person.56 
Burkert gives as the best-known case of the evolving contest: he describes the
oracle from  Delphi to the Athenians concerning the ‘wooden walls’ to which I
have already alluded. This particular example famously includes a debate about
the  meaning  of  an  oracle.  Burkert  quotes  Robert  Parker  ‘Apollo  referred  the
problem back to [the Athenians]’ and the problem becomes the linguistic puzzle
set by Apollo, ‘no longer a problem of tactics or politics, but of philology’.57 At
first sight, this seems to emphasise a dialogic approach to oracular consultation,
deliberation  and  decision-making.  But  in  fact  modern  scholars  have  seen  this
episode in a very different light, as emphasising the role of the individual: notably,
the Athenians as a group are unable to resolve the oracle; into the  aporia steps
Themistocles, who is shown ‘correctly interpreting the oracle, and confounding
the chresmologues’.58 Indeed, this episode has been compared to the traditional
competitions  between diviners  (e.g.,  Onomacritus  and Lasus,  or  Trygaeus  and
Hierocles). However, the details of  Herodotus’s account suggest that this is too
stark a portrayal.59 As Evans has pointed out, scholars seldom draw attention to
the limits of Themistocles’ correct interpretation: although he provides the insight
56 I have also argued with this model in mind, describing the oracle questions at Dodona as, to a
certain extent, offering evidence for individuals seeking to further their personal goals – or at
least to control the environment in which they are pursuing them, and the factors that might
inhibit  their  achievement.  My argument  here  does  not  deny that  this  is  part  of  what  an
oracular consultation concerns, but seeks to explore the potential for nuancing our conception
of  the  process  taking  place,  the  roles  of  those  involved,  and  the  model  of  personhood
involved.
57 BURKERT 2005, 29–50, at p. 39, citing PARKER 2000, 80.
58 As BOWDEN 2005, 107 describes the scene.
59 As  DILLERY 2005, who finds in this episode evidence for Themistocles in ‘the role of the
clairvoyant religious expert who can see what other experts and authorities cannot.’ (212).
But the argument he makes concerning the mantic character of Themistocles is confusing: for
example, in support of his argument that Themistocles is portrayed as having mantic powers
he cites Plutarch 10.1, and the description of Themistocles using ‘divine signs and oracles’.
He omits to say that Plutarch’s description includes Themistocles arranging for a particular
interpretation to be given by the priests of the sacred enclosure of the Acropolis. Rather than
showing  any  mantic  propensity,  this  seems  to  be  another  example  of  Themistocles’
manipulative,  if  not  downright  deceitful  behaviour.  Moreover,  it  conforms  more  to  the
description of a chresmologos than a mantis according to Dillery’s description (195) of how
chresmologoi were being characterized in Aristophanic comedy: ‘When Trygaeus corrects his
slave at  the beginning of the scene and declares that  Hierocles is  no  mantis  but rather  a
chresmologos,  I  think we are meant to understand precisely an unscrupulous diviner who
functions in ways that further the state’s interests, but who is in fact completely motivated by
self-interest.’ It may be that there was a historiographical tradition that cast Themistocles as a
diviner, as Dillery argues, but, equally, Plutarch’s anecdote (alongside Herodotus’ own stories
of  Themistocles’  later  deceitful  activities)  suggests  a  competing  tradition,  in  which
Themistocles was, rather, characterized as both far-sighted and manipulative.
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that ‘divine  Salamis’ foretells the defeat of the Persians, it is the chresmologues
who come up with the idea that the ‘wooden wall’ is the fleet – although this leads
them  to  the  notion  that  the  oracle  foretells  an  Athenian  defeat.60 Moreover,
Herodotus does not state that Themistocles competed with the chresmologues and
beat them: he uses a more circuitous phrase to argue that the Athenians perceived
his interpretation as something literally ‘more to be chosen’: ταύτῃ Θεμιστοκλέος
ἀποφαινομένου Ἀθηναῖοι ταῦτα σφίσι ἔγνωσαν αἱρετώτερα εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ τῶν
χρησμολόγων. So, in the end, their choice may not have been because they were
convinced  Themistocles was right, but based on other considerations – perhaps
because  it  seemed  a  better  political  option  to  follow  the  politician  than  the
chresmologues. There is  a  competitive element to this  story,  but  the emphasis
seems to be on the process of deliberation – and this  includes the role of the
Athenians,  whose  decision  to  accept  Themistocles’ version  appears  to  be  as
essential as the giving of it. This suggests that rather than seeing this as man vs.
Oracle, another way to depict this episode would be in terms of a collective effort
to work out the most appropriate action to be taken – and, importantly, this would
encompass (not oppose) the role of the Pythia, who provides a second oracle. 
Such an approach to oracular consultation differs from that usually found in
modern  scholarship,  which,  as  the  quotation  from Burkert’s  description  above
vividly illustrates, tends to represent Oracles, especially  Delphi, as knowing the
answer, and yet (wilfully) concealing it.61 And yet, a growing understanding of the
complex ways in which divination, in its diverse forms across different cultures,
seems to function,  suggests that the ambiguity of  Delphic responses may have
been neither a way of concealing the truth from consultants, nor simply a method
by which oracular responses could be ‘controlled’.62  Rather, we need to find an
explanation that encompasses the cognitive processes of deliberation involved in
this  engagement  with  the  supernatural.63 In  terms  of  the  cognitive  processes,
60 EVANS 1982, 24–29.
61 For  example,  PARKER 1985, 301–302.  Although  there  is  recognition  of  the  need  and
opportunity for ‘semantic gaps’, which allow the client to insert his or her personal context
into the answer provided in an oracular consultation (see JOHNSTON 2005, 14).
62 Controlling responses  from Oracles:  see  PARKER 2000,  301–302 who discusses  first  how
‘forms of divination …can be controlled (unconsciously, of course) by the choice of questions
so that a socially unacceptable verdict cannot emerge’. His comparison with Tiv divination
suggests that  divination is no more than ‘a distracting device’ (Parker quoting  BOHANNON
1975, 166), but he then compares the riddling oracles of Delphi to Ifa divination, ‘forcing the
client to construct by interpretation his own response.’
63 For the idea that such discussion, sometimes with the Oracle, may have been a part of the
process of divination (both the resolution of meaning, and emerging decision for action) see
for example KLINGSHIRN 2005 and FRANKFURTER 2005. Both essays focus on the human side
of this interaction, and emphasise this point with particular reference to written lot oracle
books:  KLINGSHIRN draws  attention  to  the  ways  in  which  a  diviner  using  the  Sortes
Sangallenses could not only offer advice, but also help to enact it, either making referrals to
various  other  practitioners  or  providing  spiritual  support  (110–11);  Frankfurter’s  essay
explores the role of shrine professionals who interpreted dreams, and then draws particular
attention to the role of the shrine attendants (at the shrine of St. Colluthus in late antique
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recent  scholarship  on  ancient  oracular  consultation  draws  on  research  on
divination in central and West African cultures that highlights the collaborative
nature of the decision-making that takes place during an oracular consultation. It
suggests  that  a  process  of  discussion  may  be  as  important  as  (if  not  more
important than), producing a right answer.64 Although this approach has largely
focused on the use of lot oracles, it can be taken further. Following the model of
divinatory processes in other cultures, both ancient and modern, it appears that the
imagery and metaphor of, for example, Delphic pronouncements may have drawn
on  shared  cultural  ideas  and  associations  of  meaning,  and  been  used  to  help
consultants negotiate a greater understanding of their problematic situation.65 In
terms of the cognitive process taking place, the perception of a relationship was
inseparable  from the  mechanics  of  deliberation:  those  who  consulted  Oracles
perceived  themselves  to  be  engaged  in  working  out  their  circumstances  in
communion with supernatural forces.
2.2 Divinity and Divination
Building on this idea, can we suggest that the collective effort of deliberation that
comprised an oracular consultation should also, crucially, be considered to include
the Oracle itself, and the supernatural response – or responses? Serial consulta-
tions clearly suggest oracular involvement in an ongoing process of deliberation.
One of the most well-known is  Xenophon’s consultation of  Delphi – or rather
Socrates’s suggested amendment to that consultation – in the  Anabasis  (3.1.6).
Burkert talks of this as a ‘well-known trick’, a description that fits the idea that if
a consultant wants a particular answer from the Oracle, in order to further his own
agenda, then it is important to limit the responses the Oracle might make to his
question. However, it is also possible to view it in another light, that is, as offering
some indication of the expected process of decision-making, as a collaborative
process. The process that Socrates seems to suggest – of involving an Oracle in a
series of questions and answers – would promote greater scrutiny of the decisions
that  the  consultant  was  contemplating;  it  seems  likely  that  this  was  not  an
unknown practice,  as  we will  see.66 In  fact,  it  appears  that  it  was  possible  to
involve more than one supernatural interlocutor in such a process of deliberation.
So, for example, in 388 BCE, according to  Xenophon (Hell. 4.7.2), the  Spartan
Egypt) who would have used a  Sortes book in ‘helping people to negotiate misfortune and
uncertainty through this captivating, textual form of divine speech’ (248).
64 See PEEK 2000, 26 (also cited by KLINGSHIRN 2005, 99).
65 For example: BASCOM 1969; SHAUGHNESSY 2010, 61–76; MUTIA/MECALY 2011, 37–57.
66 We might also bear this anecdote in mind when analysing the ‘Wooden Walls’ oracle, and the
apparent problem (often cited by scholars concerned with demonstrating that the consultation
process described here is unrealistic) of presenting the Pythia with several questions. In this
particular context, where the oracular response is unwelcome, we might compare the practise
of the serial consultation of the entrails of sacrificed animals, see discussion  NAIDEN 2013,
175–181.
  Oracular Consultation, Fate, and the Concept of the Individual 33
king Agesipolis when leading a campaign against Argos was offered a truce. He
consults first Zeus at Olympia and then Apollo. He phrases his second question as
follows: if ‘on this question of the truce Apollo held the same opinion as his father
…’ This  trope  appears  again  in  Plutarch’s  account  of  how  Agesilaus,  before
setting out for Asia to free the Greeks from Persian rule (c. 396/5 BCE), consulted
Dodona and then, on the instruction of the ephors, also consulted Delphi.67 Indeed,
in this context, the story of Lysander’s attempts to bribe, in turn, Delphi, Dodona
and Ammon,  could  be  viewed as  the  negative  version  of  a  familiar  theme of
multiple oracular consultations.68
Finally, turning from literary to epigraphic evidence, we find indications of an
oracular  consultation  that  involved  serial  oracles  in  a  question  tablet  from
Dodona. It appears, the consultant, Archephon, had been to a sanctuary of Apollo,
before visiting this Oracle of Zeus.69 
Ώ Ζεῦ καὶ Θέμι καὶ Διώνα Νάϊοι | Άρχεφῶν τὰν νᾶ  |  ἅν ἐναυπαγησατο<ν>, κελομένο το Άπόλλωνος,
ἔχω κατὰ χώραν ̇ καὶ σωτηρία μοι ἔσσεται καὶ ἐμὶν καὶ τᾱι ναΐ, αἰκα καὶ τὰ χρέα ἀποδ(ώ)σω
(να  = Dorian form of ναῦν)
O Zeus, and Themis and Dione Naios, Archephon built his ship according to Apollo’s order. I have it in
its place. Will there be security for me and my ship if I repay my debt?
Archephon’s consultations of the two gods do not concern the same question (as
with  the  examples  above),  but  they do suggest  that  he  employed  an  ongoing
process of deliberation, in which he perceived himself to be closely engaging with
supernatural  powers.  His  question  offers  a  very  specific  example  of  the  per-
ception, by the consultant, of ongoing involvement by the divine in his life and
daily decisions. But,  in fact,  even the less explicit  oracle tablets  from  Dodona
suggest  something  similar  about  an  ancient  Greek  individual’s  approach  to
oracular  consultation  and his  or  her  relationship  with  the  gods.  This,  in  turn,
suggests a particular conception of the self.
2.3 Phrasing and Posing
Gill argues that the participant-objective conception of the person means not only
that a shared deliberation is looked for, but that it is explored on the basis of third-
person principles: ‘the normal approach (displayed in the Platonic dialogues, for
instance) is that of seeking through shared enquiry and debate to establish what
should be universally recognised as common standards of knowledge of truth’70
67 Plut. Mor. 191B and 209A. It is possible that it indicates some kind of Spartan policy.
68 Diod.  14.13.3–8;  Plut.  Lys.  25.  There  are  other  such  examples  of  multiple  Oracle
consultations-both  literary  and  historical.  See  further,  Eidinow  “A ‘Market’ in  Futures:
Oracles and Competition”, in Press.
69 EIDINOW 2007, 113; dated to the first half of the third century by Dakaris (PAE 1967) and to 
the first half of the fourth century by LHÔTE 2006, 94.
70 GILL 2006, 403.
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Turning to the questions from Dodona we can see that this is the principle that
characterises their formulation. Approximately 1400 lead tablets, dating from the
sixth century to around the end of the second century BCE have been found at
Dodona – each tablet inscribed with at least one question to the god(s). A number
have been published,  but  many more  remain  unseen:  Professor  Anastasios-Ph.
Christidis of Thessaloniki University was editing this material for publication, but
died  before  he  completed  the  work.  He  kindly  allowed  me  to  include  in  my
research some of these unpublished tablets – for which I am indebted to him. I
also include here, where relevant, his observations about material from the un-
published texts.
By far the majority of questions posed at Dodona begin with the phrase ‘is it
better and/or more good’. The phrasing of these questions has been widely noted,
and, in general, commentators observe how such a question allows for a ‘yes’ or
‘no’ response, of the kind that could be supplied by a lot Oracle.71 However, there
is another aspect of this phrasing we can note, which reveals something about the
kind of decision-making process it was perceived to involve. A question formu-
lated in this way is asking its recipient to make an objective judgment about the
future potential of his possible action, and the use of comparatives highlights this
aspect.  The  god  is  not  asked  simply  to  provide  information,  but  to  make  a
judgment. (It is crucially important that the phrasing does not make explicit the
basis for the judgment to be made, and so leaves some cognitive room to create an
explanation when events proceed in a way that may seem less than ‘better and
more good’ to the mortal consultant.)
These  inquiries  were  frequently  phrased  in  the  third-person.  Numerous
reasons for this formulation can be suggested: simple lack of grammatical know-
ledge among consultants is one explanation, but the least plausible; more probable
is the suggestion that it reveals a procedure in which a third party wrote down the
consultant’s  question;  this  would  fit  with  the  claim that  many of  these  oracle
questions originated far away, and were being supplied by an intermediary.72 But
we  should  take  seriously  the  possibility  that  the  third-person  phrasing  of  the
question reflects the attitude of the consultant: that, although he or she was the
person writing the question, for him- or herself, the inquiry was set up in the text
as if  it was being made objectively about a third party.73 This would align the
71 See for example, PARKE 1985, 62, observes that it was a conventional formula and constructed
so that it could be answered using some ‘mechanical means’, and in PARKE 1988, 7, he argues
that this ‘traditional formula’ was used by those posing questions to Apolline shrines, and
comments that rather than foretelling the future, this response was intended to communicate
divine approval or disapproval.
72 FRANKFURTER 2005, 240  notes how the Oracle of Bes at Abydos received ‘as it were, mail in
quiries’, citing Ammianus 19.3–4.
73 GRAF 2005. Not only at Dodona: many of the answers found among the texts related to the
dice Oracles in south-western Anatolia (dating to the second century CE) turn on the idea that
an objective judgment has been made about the potential outcome of some possible activity.
For example,  from Graf (67) III 2:  πρᾶξιν ἥν πράσσεις μὴ πρᾶσσε· οὐ γὰρ ἄμεινον, that is,
Do not do the business that you are engaged in; it will not be better’. Graf translates as ‘it will
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approach  of  those  who  wrote  questions  for  the  Oracle  at  Dodona  with  Gill’s
suggestion about the deliberative processes visible in other ancient evidence – and
indicate something of their underlying conception of the self.
3. Conceptions of the Self
The oracular question tablets from Dodona illuminate a number of aspects of the
ancient Greek conception of the self.  First of all,  they reveal something of the
mental  processes  of  the  people  who  wrote  these  texts:  the  consultants  are
exercising  choice  and  demonstrating  intentionality.  Specifically,  the  questions
suggest that the individuals concerned have what some psychologists have dubbed
‘a  dialectical  mental  process’ or  self-reflexive  agency.  Essentially,  this  is  the
capacity for  some degree  of  self-consciousness  with  regard  to  action,  and the
appreciation of the possibility of there being alternative ways of engaging with the
world.74 The questions asked at  Dodona can add to this understanding of indi-
viduality, since they seem to indicate that the consultants possessed a sense of in-
dividuality  where  this  is  taken  to mean  ‘the  self-awareness  essential  to  each
distinctive individual’, which offers the individual ‘the opportunity… to develop
his or her own particular talents or character’.75 And this suggests, in turn, that we
may be able to locate here some of the characteristics that Giddens ascribes to the
modern Western self, and the process of self-actualization that he describes. It can
be argued that these texts show individual Greek men and women perceived their
potential  activities  to  involve risks;  their  visits  to  the Oracle were attempts  to
maximise their opportunities within this context.
And yet,  what  these  tablets  do  not  suggest  is  individuals  that  place  self-
assertion and individual rights above all else, or who think of themselves as self-
contained and indivisible. Quite the opposite, in fact: the very act of consulting an
Oracle suggests individuals who have an interdependent sense of self.  We can
describe this from a number of different angles: there is the (admittedly implicit)
need to find agreement among those whom the particular issue of consultation
effects. This may include the members of a state, of a group, of a family or even,
as suggested above, an individual. We see this perhaps most clearly in the material
that relates to slaves: as I have argued elsewhere, these texts may suggest that
these individuals are thinking about themselves, and their own hopes and fears for
the  future;  but  they  are  also  thinking  of  their  owners  and  their  associated
obligations.76 This  suggests  an  interdependence  that  arises  from the  nexus  of
not turn out well’ which removes the sense that an objective comparative judgment has been
made.
74 See JENKINS 2011; GARDNER 2004;  STREMMEL 1997.
75 FOWLER 2004, 9.
76 EIDINOW 2012, 244–278.
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relationships  of  a  social  context,  so  that  one’s  sense  of  self  and behaviour  is
contingent on/organized by other human beings.77 
But this nexus of relationships does not stop with one’s fellow mortals: the
inquiries made at Dodona reveal a further level of interdependence. The questions
reveal  profound  concern  among  consultants  about  divine  reflection  on  and
judgments about their behaviour, and this suggests that consultants also perceived
themselves to have a crucial interdependence with the divine. This suggests, in
turn, a conception of the self, and one’s own self-mastery, which was concerned
not only with mortal networks, but extended to the immortal realm.78 We might
expect this to raise explicit problems of the ‘ambiguity of agency’ and free will.79
Instead, as discussed above, a man’s character and his actions were perceived to
be  both  his  own  and  not  his  own,  simultaneously  supernatural  and  mortal:
consultation of a god was not consultation of a disinterested bystander.  It  was
perceived  as  the  engagement  in  a  process  of  deliberation  of  a  force  that  was
inherently involved in and affected by the outcome. 
4. Conclusion
This  paper has sought to demonstrate  some of the ways in  which the implicit
models of ‘the self’ that we bring to our analysis of ancient Greek evidence for
oracular consultation necessarily affect our interpretations of the evidence. It has
attempted, albeit briefly and partially, to make the implicit explicit, suggest some
alternative models of the self, and explore how this may recast our analysis. It has
drawn attention to evidence that ancient Greek men and women conceived of the
self in relational terms, and that this relationality included interdependence with
supernatural  forces  (and,  in  turn,  their  inter-relations)  with  regard  to  both
individual character and life-course.  
This understanding of the complex production of an individual’s fate provides
the  conceptual  context  within  which  an  oracular  consultation  took  place.  It
suggests that the consultation of an Oracle was not, or not only, perceived to be a
linear  process  of  question  and  answer  conducted  by  an  individual  who  was
attempting to extract a concealed answer about a potential action. It was also a
field  of  shared  enquiry,  negotiation  and  potential  collaboration  with  –  and,
importantly, among – myriad unseen supernatural forces. Such a conception both
shaped and was shaped by an individual’s interdependent sense of self. 
This has, necessarily, been a brief examination of only some material relevant
for re-understanding ancient Greek conceptions of the self, and it makes no claims
to be comprehensive, or to present a decisive conclusion. More importantly, there
77 GARDNER 2001.
78 As numerous cognitive theories about the formulation of conceptions of gods suggest, they
are  usually based on natural-kind concepts of agents, see, for example MCCAULEY/LAWSON
2002.
79 SLONE 2005, 188–195.
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is no room here to discuss changes over time – changes which are undoubtedly
crucial  for  such a discussion.  However,  I  hope that  it  offers  some useful  and
provocative ideas, at least about the assumptions that we as modern scholars bring
to our study of ancient Greek culture and to the role, activities and conceptions/
perceptions of the nature of the individual and his fate. 
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